Abstract A voting situation is given by a set of voters and the rules of legislation that determine minimal requirements for a group of voters to pass a motion. A priori measures of voting power, such as the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf value, show the influence of the individual players in a voting situation and are calculated by looking at marginal contributions in a simple game consisting of winning and losing coalitions derived from the legislative rules. We introduce a new way to calculate these measures directly from the set of minimal winning coalitions and derive explicit formulae for the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf values. This new approach logically appealing as it writes measures as functions of the rules of the legislation. For certain classes of games that arise naturally in applications the logical shortcut drastically simplifies the numerical calculations to obtain the indices. The technique generalises directly to all semivalues.
by being a critical or swing voter to one or more coalitions. Power measures describe this ability by real numbers. While there are at least a handful of competing measures, the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf-Penrose measures are probably the most popular of all: Shapley and Shubik (1954) consider all possible orderings of voters and look at the proportion of swing voters among them, whereas Penrose (1946) and Banzhaf (1965) simply observe for each voter the number of times he is pivotal in the game. We study the calculation of these measures.
The Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf-Penrose measures can both be expressed in terms of the marginal contributions of the players, weighted according to coefficients that depend on the measure not on the particular game at hand. This feature is shared by other semivalues, that is, values characterised by the transfer, anonymity and null player axioms, but not by all measures. The Deegan and Packel (1978) and public good Holler and Packel (1983) indices are notable exceptions.
In the context of cooperative game theory, Harsányi (1963) considers for any nperson game a set of bargaining subgames played by the members of each possible subset. The Harsányi dividends correspond to a kind of discrete derivative of the game and are expressing the pure contributions of cooperation Billot and Thisse (2005) in the given subset. This leads to another representation of the game: its Möbius transform (see Grabisch et al. 2000, and others) .
A voting situation can be given by an explicit list of coalitions that can make decisions. Often, however, not all coalitions are listed, but only the rules that must be met for a coalition to be winning. For instance, the European Union has complex rules regarding the number of members and their total population to decide whether a coalition of countries is winning in the European Council (Kóczy 2012). When calculating power indices, the common approach is to generate the corresponding (simple) cooperative game, apply the values to this game and hence obtain the results.We consider this an unnecessary detour that can be eliminated and this shortcut can, in some cases drastically reduce the required calculations.
We establish a strong link between minimal winning coalitions of a voting game, and its Möbius transform. By expressing any voting game as an alternating sum with a length corresponding to the cardinality of the set of minimal winning coalitions, we obtain a new representation of semivalues that is based on minimal winning coalitions only. Indeed, we want to stress that although the set of winning coalitions determines the set of minimal winning coalitions and conversely, only the minimal winning coalitions should come into play in the calculation of acceptable indices, as it it is the case for the Deegan-Packel and Holler-Packel indices.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, the basic notions about voting games are briefly reviewed, and the concept of semivalue is introduced. We also recall the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. In Sect. 3, we explain the Möbius transform of a game, presenting both the theory and the intuition. We present our contribution, that is, the direct formulae using the sole information of the set of minimal winning coalitions in Sect. 4. It is shown that such a (nonnormalized) expression characterizes the class of semivalues. In Sect. 5 we give several applications, and show the effectiveness of our formulae in these contexts. Finally, some concluding remarks, including literary comparisons are made in Sect. 6.
